Saturday, October 29, 2005

Loud v. Does Subpoena Stayed by Second Circuit

Interim Stay granted in Loud v. Does.

The subpoena issued to ISP Cablevision, in RIAA peer to peer file sharing case Loud v. Does 1-74, has been temporarily stayed by Hon. Robert D. Sack, a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The stay is in effect until a 3-judge panel of that Court has had an opportunity to consider "Jane Doe"'s motion for a stay pending the hearing and determination of her appeal from the order of District Court Judge Robert W. Sweet denying her motion to quash subpoena.

That panel is scheduled to meet on November 22, 2005.

Order of Second Circuit Judge Robert D. Sack Granting Interim Stay of Subpoena

Friday, October 28, 2005

New Round of Secret RIAA Lawsuits against College Students whose computers may have used "i2hub"

On October 26th the RIAA commenced a new round of copyright infringement lawsuits against 745 individuals, including computer network users at 17 colleges.
RIAA President Cary Sherman said the college students are guilty of "theft".

The lawsuits were commenced by filing, and only named "John Does", so the college students involved do not even know they have been sued.

They will not know until months, or even years, later. Meanwhile, various judicial proceedings will have taken place, with only the RIAA represented.

The people "sued" are people who may have had IP addresses that were associated in some way with peer-to-peer services such as Grokster, Kazaa and LimeWire.

This particular round of lawsuits targeted computers from which someone may have used the file-sharing application i2hub.

This round of litigation marks the fourth time the music industry has attacked IP addresses that are part of university computer networks, for a total of 635 lawsuits at 39 campuses this year.

These secret lawsuits target students at Boston University, Carnegie Mellon University, Columbia University, Drexel University, Georgia Institute of Technology, Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Michigan State University, New York University, Ohio State University, Princeton University, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Rochester Institute of Technology, University of California – Berkeley, University of Massachusetts – Amherst, University of Pennsylvania, and University of Southern California.

In addition to the John Doe "lawsuits" filed today, music companies filed lawsuits earlier this month against 81 named defendants. The names of these individuals, whose Internet Protocol (IP) addresses were previously identified in “John Doe” lawsuits, were secretly subpoenaed from their respective Internet Service Providers (ISP), which was permitted by the Courts in "ex parte" proceedings -- i.e., proceedings in which only one side, the RIAA, was represented.

Those lawsuits against named defendants were filed in federal district courts in Hartford, Connecticut; Newnan and Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago, Urbana, Rock Island and Peoria, Illinois; Grand Rapids, Kalamazoo and Marquette, Michigan; Camden, Trenton and Newark, New Jersey; Brooklyn, White Plains, New York and Long Island, New York; Greenville, Columbia, Aiken and Charleston, South Carolina; and Austin, Corpus Christi, Houston, San Antonio and Midland, Texas.

See also article by Jon Newton at p2pNet:

"745 new RIAA p2p victims"

Tuesday, October 25, 2005

Agenda for First Annual P2P Litigation Summit

First Annual P2P Litigation Summit

When: Thursday, November 3, 2005

Where: Lincoln Hall, Northwestern University School of Law
Downtown Chicago Campus

Cost: $150.00 per person

Registration and information

PROGRAM OUTLINE

8:15 – 9:00 Registration and Social
Coffee and Continental Breakfast

9:00 – 9:05 Welcome and Overview
Charles Lee Mudd Jr., Privacy Resolutions P.C.

9:05 – 9:25 Defendant speaks: David Andora, Defendant
Virgin Records International, et al. v. David Andora,
04 C 7470, N.D., Illinois.

9:30 – 11:00 Panel I: Broadening the Landscape
Too-often, debates about file-sharing focus exclusively on the views and actions of US-based content providers and music/video fans. This panel will offer diverse perspectives that are sometimes forgotten. Panelists will explore the pros and cons of litigation against end-users as opposed to intermediaries, the role of Internet Service Providers in the file-sharing litigation, and the role of private investigators in identifying potential defendants and building legal cases.

Moderator: Cindy Cohn, Electronic Frontier Foundation

Speakers:
Mark Ishikawa, CEO, Bay TSP, Inc.
Randy Cadenhead, Corporate Privacy Counsel, Cox Communications
Doug Lichtman, University of Chicago Law School

11:00 - 11:15 Break

11:15 – 12:45 Panel II: Escaping the Litigation Quagmire: Searching for Alternative Means to Reduce Infringement and Litigation

Two years and 14,000 lawsuits after the RIAA filed the first wave of cases against P2P file-sharing music fans, both file-sharing and file-sharing litigation continue unabated. Panelists will discuss alternative approaches, from voluntary collective licensing to legislative intervention, and compare US approaches to those of neighboring jurisdictions, such as Canada and the European Union.

Moderator: Charles Lee Mudd Jr.,
Privacy Resolutions P.C.

Speakers:
Derek Slater, Berkman Center for Internet and Society
Alex Cameron, Faculty of Law, University of Ottowa
Henry Perritt, Jr., Chicago-Kent College of Law

12:45 – 1:45 Lunch
Lowden Hall

1:45 – 3:15 Panel III: Litigation Update

Panelists will discuss recent decisions and events on the litigation landscape. Which legal strategies are working in the courts? Which are not? Audience members are strongly encouraged to share their experiences.

Moderator: Corynne McSherry, Electronic Frontier Foundation

Speakers:
Paul Levy, Public Citizen Litigation Group
Aden Fine, American Civil Liberties Union
Ray Beckerman, Beldock, Levine & Hoffman, LLC

3:15 – 3:30 Break

3:30 – 5:30 Panel IV: Settlement v. Litigation

Panelists will discuss settlement strategies, settlement agreements and the viability of choosing to litigate instead. What is the formula for current settlement demands? What circumstances give rise to flexibility? Is litigation worthwhile in light of litigation developments? What is the future for mass settlement support centers? What are some of the key issues within existing settlement agreements? Audience members will be strongly encouraged to share their experiences.

Moderator: Cindy Cohn, Electronic Frontier Foundation

Speakers:
Eli Eilbott, Duncan, Weinberg, Genzer & Pembroke, P.C.
Charles Lee Mudd, Jr., Privacy Resolutions P.C.
John T. Hermann, Law Office of John T. Hermann
Charles S. Baker, Porter & Hedges, LLP

For further information:

Contact: Katherine Mudd
Phone: 773-588-5410
Email: katherine@redmonarch.com

http://www.p2plitigationsummit.com/

Saturday, October 22, 2005

A Puzzle for Techies: Did 'Metadata' and 'Hash' Show that Files were Copied?

A puzzle for techies:

In an RIAA case a federal judge said that a screen shot of defendant John Doe Number 7's Kazaa shared files folder was enough to show copyright infringement because

"[RIAA] obtained "metadata" about the files that Doe No. 7 was disseminating, which often reveal who originally copied a particular sound recording from a CD to a computer disk (a process called "ripping") and provide a type of digital fingerprint, called a "hash," that can show whether two users obtained a file from the same source.... Using the metadata associated with the music filed that Doe No. 7 was offering for distribution on Kazaa, plaintiffs have determined that many sound recordings were ripped by different people using different brands of ripping software. Such information creates a strong inference that Doe No. 7 was not simply copying his or her own lawfully purchased CDs onto a computer, but had downloaded those files from other P2P users."

Was the judge right or wrong?

The case was Elektra v. Does 1-9

Elektra v. Does, September 8, 2004, Decision of Judge Sweet

United States District Court,
S.D. New York.
ELEKTRA ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
DOES 1-9, Defendants.
No. 04 Civ. 2289(RWS).

Sept. 8, 2004.
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, New York, NY, By: J. Christopher Jensen, Jason D. Sanders, for Plaintiff, of counsel.

Jenner & Block, Washington, DC, By: Thomas J. Perrelli, for Defendant, of counsel.

Richard A. Altman, New York, NY, for Defendant Doe No. 7.

OPINION

SWEET, J.

*1 Defendant Doe No. 7 has moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) to quash the subpoena served upon New York University ("NYU"), and pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 20 and 21 to sever Doe No. 7 from this action and to require plaintiffs to file a separate action against him. Doe No. 7 also moves to dismiss the complaint against him for lack of personal jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to quash is denied, as is the motion to dismiss. The motion to sever Doe No. 7 is granted.

Parties

Plaintiffs Elektra Entertainment Group Inc. ("Elektra"), Capitol Records, Inc. ("Capitol"), Atlantic Recording Corp. ("Atlantic"), Interscope Records ("Interscope"), Arista Records, Inc. ("Arista"), Motown Record Company, L.P. ("Motown"), Warner Bros. Records Inc. ("Warner Bros."), UMG Recordings, Inc. ("UMG"), Maverick Recording Co. ("Maverick"), Sony Music Entertainment Inc. ("Sony"), Virgin Records America, Inc. ("Virgin"), BMG Music ("BMG") (collectively, the "plaintiffs") are major recording companies who own copyrights in sound recordings.

According to the complaint, the defendants are or were active participants in Fast Track, a peer-to-peer ("P2P") network. A P2P network is an online media distribution system that allows users to have their computers function as an interactive Internet site, disseminating files for other users to copy. Each defendant is alleged to have offered copyrighted sound recordings stored on his or her computer for others to download and to have downloaded copyrighted sound recordings from other users of the Fast Track network.

Prior Proceedings

On March 23, 2004, plaintiffs filed their complaint. On March 25, 2004, this Court granted plaintiffs' ex parte motion to take expedited discovery, which was narrowly targeted to identifying the defendants. According to plaintiffs, NYU has matched the IP addresses to its list of computer users and notified the defendants that plaintiffs sought their identification in connection with this case. Of the 9 defendants, only Doe No. 7 has filed a motion to quash. NYU has informed plaintiffs that NYU will not produce the identities of any of the defendants until this motion has been resolved.

Doe No. 7 served this motion on opposing counsel on April 28, 2004. After exchange of briefs, argument was heard on the motion on May 5, 2004, at which time the motion was deemed fully submitted.

Background

The plaintiffs allege that they have found each of the defendants openly disseminating sound recordings whose copyrights they own on the P2P network. Plaintiffs themselves logged on to the P2P network and viewed the files that each defendant was offering to other users. According to plaintiffs, each defendant has chosen to make available from his or her computer hundreds of sound recordings whose copyrights are owned by various of the plaintiffs.

Doe No. 7 is alleged to be a user of the Kazaa system, one of the most popular forms of peer-to-peer software. Users of the Kazaa system connect to the Fast Track network, as do all of the defendants in this case.

*2 While plaintiffs were able to gather significant information about the defendants' allegedly infringing conduct, they were not able to ascertain the name, address or any other contact information for any of the defendants. Instead, plaintiffs could only identify the Internet Protocol ("IP") address from which each defendant was disseminating plaintiffs' copyrighted works.

An IP address is a 10-digit number that specifically identifies a particular computer using the Internet. Using the IP address, plaintiffs determined that each defendant was using NYU's network facilities to disseminate the plaintiffs' copyrighted works. From the IP address provided by plaintiffs, NYU can match the IP address, date and time with the computer that was using the IP address when plaintiffs observed the alleged infringement. NYU is therefore the only entity that can identify the defendants in this case.

NYU's "Guidelines for Compliance With the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act" (the "privacy guidelines") state that NYU will release identifying information without the consent of the student in response to a civil subpoena "provided that the University attempts to notify the student of the order or subpoena before complying with it ..." http://www.nyu.edu/apr/ferpa.htm. NYU's Information Technology Services includes among the "responsibilities of all NYU computer and network users" that each account holder "will respect the rights of copyright owners, and, when appropriate, obtain permission from owners before using or copying protected material ..." http:// www.nyu.edu/its/policies/respon.html.

Discussion

Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) provides that a court shall quash or modify a subpoena if it "requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and no exception or waiver applies." Doe No. 7 argues that because the First Amendment protects the right to speak and to use the Internet anonymously, Doe No. 7 has a qualified privilege, and that plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to overcome the privilege.

In this district, the Honorable Denny Chin recently considered a substantively identical motion to quash involving many of the same plaintiffs, and a group of anonymous defendants, all of whom subscribed to the same Internet service provider, or ISP. See Sony Music Entertainment Inc. v. Does 1-40, 04 Civ. 473, 2004 WL 1656538 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2004). Judge Chin's analysis is highly persuasive, and the rationale and resolution of the motion in Sony Music will be adopted here.

Judge Chin first recognized that "the First Amendment protects anonymous speech." Id. at *4 (citing Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)). Further, "the First Amendment's protection extends to the Internet." Id. at *5 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F.Supp.2d 244, 259 (D.D.C.2000), rev'd on other grounds, Recording Indus. Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C.Cir.2003)).

*3 First Amendment protection of anonymous speech, like other kinds of speech, is subject to limits. Most importantly in the present context, the First Amendment "does not protect copyright infringement." Id. (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1985); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F.Supp.2d 211, 220 (S.D.N.Y.2000) ((the "Supreme Court ... has made it unmistakably clear that the First Amendment does not shield copyright infringement")).

The protection offered by the First Amendment is implicated when the identities of anonymous speakers are sought through civil subpoena. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (order requiring association to produce membership list interfered with First Amendment freedom of association).

In addition to the case before Judge Chin, several courts have considered motions to quash subpoenas seeking identifying subscriber information from ISPs, reaching different results. See, e.g., Verizon, 257 F.Supp.2d at 267- 68 (denying ISP's motion to quash subpoena served pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 17 U.S.C. § 512(h), seeking subscriber information about alleged copyright infringers); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., No. 405070, 2000 WL 1210372, at *1 (Va.Cir.Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev'd on other grounds America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350, 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va.2001) (denying motion to quash subpoena seeking identity of anonymous defendants who allegedly defamed plaintiff and disclosed insider information); Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1097 (W.D.Wash.2001) (granting motion to quash subpoena seeking identities of non-party anonymous posters to Internet chat room); Anderson v. Hale, No. 00 C 2021, 2001 WL 503045, at *9 (N.D.Ill. May 10, 2001) (granting motion to quash subpoena seeking identity of anonymous members of church).

In Sony Music, Judge Chin persuasively held that "the use of P2P file copying networks to download, distribute, or make available for distribution copyrighted sound recordings, without permission ... qualifies as speech, but only to a degree," 2004 WL 1656538, at *6. Judge Chin first noted that the person engaging in file sharing is "not seeking to communicate a thought or convey an idea. Instead, the individual's real purpose is to obtain music [free of charge]." Id.
However, an argument may be made that a file sharer is making a statement by downloading and making available to others copyrighted music without charge and without license to do so. Alternatively, the file sharer may be expressing himself or herself through the music selected and made available to others.
Id. The use of a P2P network for file sharing, therefore, qualifies as speech for First Amendment purposes, although it is not "political expression," and is therefore not "afforded the broadest protection." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346; see also Verizon, 257 F.Supp.2d at 260 ("there is some level of First Amendment protection that should be afforded to anonymous expression on the Internet, even though the degree of protection is minimal where alleged copyright infringement is the expression at issue.").

The Need for Disclosure Outweighs the Defendants' First Amendment Interests

*4 In considering whether the defendants' identities were protected from disclosure by the First Amendment, Judge Chin considered five factors: 1) whether plaintiffs have made "a concrete showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm"; 2) the "specificity of the discovery request"; 3) "the absence of alternative means to obtain the subpoenaed information"; 4) "a central need to obtain the subpoenaed information to advance the claim"; and 5) "the party's expectation of privacy." Sony Music, 2004 WL 1656538, at *7 (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577-81 (N.D.Cal.1999); America Online, 2000 WL 1210372, at *8; Verizon, 257 F.Supp.2d at 260-61, 267-68; Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 342 N.J.Super. 134, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2001)).

Each factor favors the disclosure of the defendants' identities. First, plaintiffs have made a showing of copyright infringement. "A prima facie claim of copyright infringement consists of two elements: '(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of the constituent elements of the work that are original." ' Id. (quoting Arden v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 908 F.Supp. 1248, 1257 (S.D.N.Y.1995). Plaintiffs have alleged that they are the copyright owners of the sound recordings which Doe No. 7 is alleged to have copied. Further, plaintiffs have submitted the "screen shots" of Doe No. 7's "share folder" showing the computer files disseminated through Kazaa. Plaintiffs downloaded a sample of these files an determined that they were the sound recordings for which plaintiffs own the copyrights. Further, plaintiffs obtained "metadata" about the files that Doe No. 7 was disseminating, which
often reveal who originally copied a particular sound recording from a CD to a computer disk (a process called "ripping") and provide a type of digital fingerprint, called a "hash," that can show whether two users obtained a file from the same source.
Plaintiffs' Brief at 8. Using the metadata associated with the music filed that Doe No. 7 was offering for distribution on Kazaa, plaintiffs have determined that many sound recordings were ripped by different people using different brands of ripping software. Such information creates a strong inference that Doe No. 7 was not simply copying his or her own lawfully purchased CDs onto a computer, but had downloaded those files from other P2P users.
[italics supplied] Because "the use of P2P systems to download and distribute copyrighted music has been held to constitute copyright infringement," Sony Music, 2004 WL 1656538, at *8 (citing A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013-14 (9th Cir.2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir.2003)), plaintiffs have adequately pled copyright infringement to establish a prima facie claim.

Second, plaintiffs' discovery request is sufficiently specific. Plaintiffs seek only to identify the defendants in order to serve process, based on the date and time when they downloaded or distributed specific copyrighted sound recordings.

*5 Third, plaintiffs have demonstrated the absence of alternative means to obtain the subpoenaed information. With the publicly available information relating to Doe No. 7's IP address, plaintiffs were only able to ascertain that Doe No. 7 was using NYU's network facilities, and that such facilities are limited to members of the "NYU community." Only NYU, however, can identify Doe No. 7 and the other defendants with sufficient specificity to permit service.

Fourth, plaintiffs have shown that they have a central need to obtain the subpoenaed information to advance the claim. "Ascertaining the identities and residences of the Doe defendants is critical to plaintiffs' ability to pursue litigation, for without this information, plaintiffs will be unable to serve process." Id .

Finally, Doe No. 7 is entitled to only a minimal "expectation of privacy in downloading and distributing copyrighted songs without permission." Id. (citing Verizon, 257 F.Supp.2d at 260-61, 267-68). NYU's privacy guidelines state that it will comply with a civil subpoena seeking identifying information without a student's consent provided that the student is first notified of the request. And NYU's Network Responsibilities state that users must obtain the permission of copyright owners before copying protected material.

Because each of the factors favors disclosure, Doe No. 7's "First Amendment right to remain anonymous must give way to plaintiffs' right to use the judicial process to pursue what appear to be meritorious copyright infringement claims." Id. at *9. The motion to quash the subpoena is denied, as is Doe No. 7's request for attorney's fees to contest the subpoena.

Doe No. 7's Challenge to Personal Jurisdiction is Premature

Doe No. 7 has also argued that plaintiffs have not established that personal jurisdiction may be exercised over him or her. Doe No. 7 argues that although the plaintiffs have traced the IP address used by Doe No. 7 to NYU, "that does not automatically mean that the defendants can be found in New York." Doe No. 7's Brief at 15. While that may be true, a ruling on personal jurisdiction at this stage in the litigation is premature:
[W]ithout the identifying information sought by plaintiffs in the [NYU] subpoena, it would be difficult to assess properly the existence of personal jurisdiction over the Doe defendants. This analysis requires an evaluation of the contacts between the various defendants and the forum state.
Id. (citing LiButti v. United States, 178 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir.1999)). Doe No. 7's motion is accordingly denied, with leave to renew following expedited discovery.

Doe No. 7's Motion for Severance is Granted

Doe No. 7 argues that the joinder of the seven Doe defendants is improper because the only common element between the defendants is their alleged use of the NYU networks. Doe No. 7 therefore moves pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 20 to be severed from this action, and further requests that the Court order all defendants severed and order the plaintiffs to commence separate actions against each defendant.

*6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 lays out the requirements for the permissive joinder of defendants:
All persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right of relief in respect of or arising out of the same transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
"[T]he remedy for improper joinder is severance ..." Sony Music, 2004 WL 1656538, at *9 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 21).

"[D]istrict courts have broad discretion to decide whether joinder is appropriate, even when the requirements of Rule 20(a) have been met." Ghaly v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 228 F.Supp.2d 283, 292 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (citing Briarpatch Ltd. v. Pate, 81 F.Supp.2d 509, 515 (S.D.N.Y.2000)). "The well-established policy underlying permissive joinder is to promote trial convenience and expedite the resolution of lawsuits." Puricelli v. CNA Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. 139, 142 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (citing Blesedell v. Mobil Oil Co., 708 F.Supp. 1408, 1421 (S.D .N.Y.1989)). The Supreme Court has held that "the impulse [under the Federal Rules] is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).

"Courts have generally adopted a case-by-case approach in determining whether plaintiffs' claims constitute a 'single transaction or occurrence' for purposes of Rule 20." Puricelli, 185 F.R.D. at 142 (citing Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332 (5th Cir.1974); Blesedell, 708 F.Supp. at 1412). However, in defining transaction or occurrence, "courts have found Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(a) to be particularly instructive, and have concluded with reference to that Rule that the phrase encompasses 'all logically related claims." ' Id. (quoting Mosley, 497 F .2d at 1333).

Plaintiffs argue that the claims against each defendant involve common questions of copyright law and common questions of fact concerning the operation of NYU's network and the Fast Track network. Further, plaintiffs argue that the claims are logically related by the use of the Fast Track network.

Doe No. 7 argues that plaintiffs have not asserted any right to relief against all defendants "jointly, severally or in the alternative," that there is no transaction or occurrence common to Doe No. 7 and the other defendants, and that beyond the use of NYU's network and the Fast Track network, there are no factual commonalities. In addition, Doe No. 7 notes that only six of the twelve plaintiffs have alleged that Doe No. 7 infringed the copyrights on their sound recordings.

At least two district courts have ordered severance in similar suits. In BMG Music v. Does 1-203, Civil Action No. 04-650, (E.D.Pa. March 5, 2004), reconsidered and aff'd, April 5, 2004, the court found:
*7 The claims against the different Defendants will require separate trials as they may involve separate witnesses, different evidence, and different legal theories and defenses, which could lead to confusion of the jury. United States v. 1,071.08 Acres of Land, Yuma & Mohave Counties, Arizona, 564 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.1977); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 21; Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b). Moreover, the Court finds that there will almost certainly [be] separate issues of fact with respect to each Defendant. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 20.
BMG Music, slip op. at 1. Another district court approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation of a Magistrate Judge which recommended that both plaintiffs and defendants be severed, finding that "each case presents a unique set of facts and circumstances." Interscope Records v. Does 1-25, Case No. 6:04-cv-197-Orl-22DAB (M.D.Fla. Apr. 27, 2004), slip op. at 2. In the Magistrate Judge's Report, it was found that the claims bore no logical relation to each other, and that
[t]he record is bereft of any allegation that the twenty-five Defendants are jointly or severally liable to the sixteen Plaintiffs other than that the Defendants use the Fast Track peer-to-peer network.
....
Plaintiffs fail to show how or which of the Defendants have actually downloaded Plaintiffs' copyrighted songs from another Defendant (which could conceivably link such Defendants) as opposed to any other users of the systems.
Interscope Records v. Does 1-25, Case No. 6:04-cv-197-Orl-22DAB (M.D.Fla. Apr. 1, 2004), Report and Recommendation at 5-6.

Plaintiffs argue that these cases "required Plaintiffs to allege that all of Plaintiffs' claims arose from the same transaction or occurrence, rather than a logically related series of transactions or occurrences, as Rule 20 explicitly permits." Plaintiffs' Br. at 22 n. 11. The opinions, however, show that the proper tests were applied, and that proper cognizance was taken of judicial efficiency and fairness to the parties. See also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 11C Music, 202 F.R.D. 229, 232 (M.D.Tenn.2001) (ordering severance in case brought by music recording companies against music publishers, recording labels and other entities for copyright infringement based on "sampled" music, and finding that "[e]ach song and the alleged sampling contained therein represents a discrete occurrence," despite the fact that some defendants may have been involved in the production of more than one song). Accordingly, Doe No. 7's motion for severance is granted. Plaintiffs shall file their claims against Doe No. 7 in a separate action. Both plaintiffs and defendants may, however, consider consolidating at least some of the pre-trial discovery in the two cases. See Tele-Media Co. of Western Connecticut v. Antidormi, 179 F.R.D. 75, 76 (D.Conn.1998) (following severance, "the advantages of a single action must be achieved, to the extent they can be, through consolidation or other means.").

*8 Doe No. 7 has also requested that all other defendants be severed as well, despite the fact that no other defendant has made a similar motion. Because the number of Doe defendants in this case is not unduly large, the failure to sever the remaining claims would not "result in prejudice, expense or delay." Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir.1968). Plaintiffs have also argued that the non-moving defendants may wish to litigate the case as a cost-saving measure. Accordingly, the remaining claims will not be severed at the present time. However, the Court will entertain motions for severance from the remaining defendants.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Doe No. 7's motion to quash the subpoena served on NYU is denied, as is Doe No. 7's request for attorney's fees. The motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied as premature, but may be renewed later. Doe No. 7's motion to sever the claims against Doe No. 7 from the remainder of the action is granted, and plaintiffs shall file a separate action against Doe No. 7. Pre-trial discovery in the two actions may, however, be consolidated. Severance of the remaining defendants is denied at this time.

It is so ordered.

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2004 WL 2095581 (S.D.N.Y.), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 28,873

Motions, Pleadings and Filings (Back to top)

• 1:04cv02289 (Docket) (Mar. 23, 2004)

END OF DOCUMENT

Friday, October 21, 2005

Conference Scheduled in Interscope v. Does; New York City area Subpoena Recipients Should Check Their Subpoena

New York City area people who have received a copy of a subpoena addressed to Time Warner Cable in Interscope v. Does, pending in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, Docket # 2005 Civ. 07667 (RJH), may be interested to know that a scheduling conference has been set for Thursday, December 1st, at 12:00 Noon by Judge Richard J. Holwell.

The location is Courtroom 17B, at the federal courthouse, at 500 Pearl Street, in Manhattan.

These hearings are usually held in secret, because the "John Does" and "Jane Does" do not even know they have been sued and that there is a case pending against them.

The hearings are open to the public. Any member of the public has a right to go, whether a defendant or not.

Order Setting Scheduling Conference date

New P2P File Sharing Case in Manhattan Federal Court: Elektra v. Barker

Yet another peer-to-peer filesharing case has been brought in Manhattan Federal Court against a named defendant.

This case is captioned Elektra v. Barker.

Litigation documents to follow.

Jane Doe Moves for Stay Pending Appeal in Loud v. Does, in US Second Circuit Court of Appeals

In a Manhattan federal court, peer to peer ("p2p") filesharing case against seventy four "John Does", Loud v. Does, "Jane Doe" -- after filing her appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from Judge Sweet's handwritten order denying her motion to quash subpoena -- has made a motion in the Second Circuit for a stay of the subpoena pending the hearing and determination of the appeal.
Affidavit of Ray Beckerman in support of motion for stay
Motion information statement in support of motion for stay
Appeal preargument statement

Pro se Defendant Loses Dismissal Motion in Houston, Texas; Judge's Decision Gives No Reasons

It appears that a pro se defendant (i.e. a defendant representing himself, without an attorney), made a motion to dismiss complaint in Houston federal court, and the motion was denied. The judge's one-sentence order denying the motion was issued either on the same day, or one day after, the RIAA had put in its opposition papers, and does not say what the reason was for the ruling. It does not appear that any briefs were submitted by the defendant, or that the arguments made in Elektra v. Santangelo were made. The name of the case is BMG Music v. Conklin. Copies of the litigation documents of which we are aware are as follows:

Motion
Opposition
Order


Normally orders denying a motion to dismiss are not appealable in federal court.

RIAA Opposes Jane Doe's Motion to Quash in Interscope v. Does

In Interscope v. Does, a peer to peer (p2p) filesharing action brought by the RIAA in Manhattan federal court, before Judge Richard J. Holwell, the RIAA has opposed the motion to quash subpoena made by a "Jane Doe", based upon the insufficiency of the underlying complaint for failure to allege specific acts, dates, and times of copying.

Litigation documents:

Complaint.
(Alternate link)(Alternate link #2)(Alternate link #3)

Notice of Motion
(Alternate link)
Affidavit of Daniel A. Singer
(Alternate link)
Memorandum of Law
(Alternate link)
Exhibit A
(Alternate link)
Exhibit B
(Alternate link)

Memorandum of law in opposition
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E

Monday, October 17, 2005

RIAA Spent $14.5 Million in Legal Fees Last Year

According to a report in p2pnet.net, the RIAA spent $14.5 Million on legal fees last year.

Appeal Filed in Loud v. Does

On Monday, October 17th, "Jane Doe" filed an appeal from the "memo endorsed" order of Judge Robert W. Sweet, entered October 14, 2005, in a peer to peer (p2p) music file sharing case, Loud v. Does denying "Jane Doe"'s motion to quash subpoena. (Alternate link for October 14th order)

The order of Judge Sweet is in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The appeal is in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Copy of order appealed from:

The order stayed its effect for ten (10) business days in order to give "Jane Doe" time to file an appeal and make an emergency motion for a stay in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Appeal documents:

Notice of Appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals for Second Circuit
Appeal preargument statement

Affidavit of Ray Beckerman in support of motion for stay
Motion information statement in support of motion for stay

Prior papers:

Complaint.

Jane Doe's Notice of Motion to Quash Subpoena
Affidavit of Morlan Ty Rogers in Support of Motion to Quash
Exhibit A
Exhibit B
Jane Doe's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Quash

Memorandum of law in opposition
(Alternate link)(Alternate link #2)(Alternate link #3)(Alternate link #4)
Appendix to Memorandum of law in opposition
(Alternate link)(Alternate link #2)(Alternate link #3)(Alternate link #4)

Jane Doe's Reply Memorandum of Law
(Alternate link)(Alternate link #2)(Alternate link #3)

Judge Issues Handwritten Order in Loud v. Does Denying Motion to Quash and Staying Order to Give Time for Appeal & Emergency Motion

Judge Robert W. Sweet issued a "memo endorsed" (handwritten) order in Loud v. Does, denying "Jane Doe"'s motion to quash subpoena. (Alternate link)

The order stayed its effect for ten (10) business days in order to give "Jane Doe" time to file an appeal and make an emergency motion for a stay in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The lawyers for Ms. "Doe" are Ray Beckerman, Morlan Ty Rogers, and Daniel A. Singer of Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP

New Motion to Quash by Another Jane Doe in Interscope v. Does

In another peer to peer (p2p) filesharing action brought by the RIAA in Manhattan federal court, this one before Judge Richard J. Holwell, a "Jane Doe" has moved to quash the subpoena issued to her ISP, based upon the insufficiency of the underlying complaint for failure to allege specific acts, dates, and times of copying.

Complaint
(Alternate link)

Notice of Motion
(Alternate link)
Affidavit of Daniel A. Singer
(Alternate link)
Memorandum of Law
(Alternate link)
Exhibit A
(Alternate link)
Exhibit B
(Alternate link)

The motion is returnable on December 7th, 2005, at 10:00 A.M., in Manhattan federal district court, before Judge Holwell.

The lawyers for defendant are Ray Beckerman, Morlan Ty Rogers, and Daniel A. Singer of Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP

Friday, October 14, 2005

"Jane Doe" Motion to Quash Subpoena Denied From the Bench by Judge Sweet

Jane Doe's motion to quash subpoena in Loud v. Does, a peer to peer file sharing case against a number of "John Doe" defendants, was denied, from the bench (i.e. immediately), by Manhattan Federal Court judge Robert W. Sweet on October 12th.

The judge concluded that plaintiffs' alleging "continuing infringement" from the date of the complaint is sufficient.

The judge stayed the effect of the order for ten (10) days, to enable the movant to file an appeal, and an emergency motion for a stay, with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Judge's "Memo Endorsed" Order (Handwritten order written on face of moving papers) dated October 12, 2005

A full set of the motion papers is set forth under "Loud v. Does" at http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2005/10/index-of-litigation-documents.html.

The lawyers for defendant "Jane Doe", a person whose IP address was allegedly used by someone setting up a p2p filesharing account, are Ray Beckerman, Morlan Ty Rogers, and Daniel A. Singer of Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP

The motion was argued by Mr. Rogers. Mr. Beckerman had this to say about the outcome: "It is most unfortunate that the Court concluded that merely making a vague and conclusory allegation that defendant has committed a continuing infringement since the day of the complaint, without any substantiation of the allegation, is a sufficient basis for upholding these subpoenas. We find this result to be inconsistent with the rules for pleading copyright infringement, and, if we are requested by our client to do so, will file an appeal."

Wednesday, October 12, 2005

Jane Doe's Motion to Quash in Loud v. Does to be argued in Manhattan Federal Court at 12:00 noon today

Jane Doe's motion to quash subpoena in Loud v. Does is scheduled to be argued today at 12:00 noon in Manhattan Federal Court, before Judge Robert W. Sweet. Courthouse is 500 Pearl Street. Courtoom is 18C.

10/12/05
-R.B.

Tuesday, October 11, 2005

National Law Journal: RIAA Defendants "Fighting Back"

The National Law Journal reports:

Music piracy defendants fighting back


Settling resisted, counterclaims filed.

By Tresa Baldas
Staff reporter
October 10, 2005


When attorney John Hermann took on his first music piracy lawsuit recently on behalf of a woman who was being sued by the music industry, he was skeptical.

"I thought I was the only one stupid enough to take on one of these cases," he recalled.

He was wrong.

In the last year-particularly in the last six months-a growing number of defendants have refused to settle music industry suits, challenging what they allege are groundless lawsuits filed by the Recording Industry Association of America.

In the last two years, the RIAA has filed 14,800 lawsuits against individuals for illegally downloading and distributing copyrighted music on the Internet.

While the RIAA holds that most suits settle, attorneys note that many defendants have started fighting back.

In New York, a single mother of five has hired a lawyer to fight her copyright infringement suit, claiming a kid's friend may have downloaded copyrighted material without her knowledge.

In Seattle, another parent is challenging the RIAA, adamantly denying any illegal downloading. In Oregon, a defendant with an 8-year-old daughter is fighting claims that she downloaded "gangster rap" music at 4:30 a.m.

And in Michigan, three other RIAA lawsuits are facing opposition, including a case against a 14-year-old girl, and another action against the owners of a daycare center. "The cases are just starting to trickle through the court system and as a result we're starting to see objections," said Hermann, a solo in Berkley, Mich., who is handling the Michigan lawsuits.

Hermann and other defense attorneys allege that the RIAA is using "scare tactics" to force settlements, intimidating defendants into paying up before they can seek legal help, or dispute the charges. So far, about 3,400 of the RIAA suits have reached settlement.

Complete Text of Article

Monday, October 10, 2005

Friday, October 07, 2005

Interscope v. Does yet another RIAA p2p case, against 100 "John Does" in Manhattan Federal Court

As part of its mass litigation campaign against individuals whose names are associated with IP addresses which are associated with peer to peer file sharing accounts, the RIAA commenced, on August 31st, yet another mass case against "John Doe" defendants who do not even know they have been sued, in Manhattan Federal Court.

This case names 100 "John Doe" defendants, and is assigned to District Judge Richard J. Holwell. This litigation is captioned "Interscope Records v. Does 1-100.", and is under docket number 05-CV-7667 (RJH).

As with all of its other cases, the RIAA sought and obtained an ex parte order granting it discovery. ("ex parte" means without the other side having notice or an opportunity to be heard in opposition).

People in the metropolitan area have been receiving notices from Time Warner Cable, an internet service provider, that it has been subpoenaed to turn over their names and addresses to the RIAA in this new case. The subpoena Time Warner attaches to their letter is returnable October 26, 2005.

At least one "Jane Doe" is making a motion to quash the subpoena. She is represented by Ray Beckerman, Morlan Ty Rogers, and Daniel A. Singer of Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP


Complaint.
(Alternate link)

Loud v. Does motion to quash fully briefed

"Jane Doe" has submitted her reply memorandum of law in support of her motion to quash subpoena in the peer to peer fileshare case pending before Judge Robert W. Sweet in Manhattan federal court, Loud v. Does, thus completing the briefing process.

Jane Doe's Reply Memorandum of Law
(Alternate link)

Magistrate Judge (a) Permits RIAA Missouri Lawyers to Appear By Telephone (b) Orders RIAA Corporate Rep with "Settlement Authority" to Phone in Too

In the Atlantic v. Huggins peer to peer file sharing case in Brooklyn federal court, a settlement conference was scheduled for Friday, October 7th.

On September 21st, Mr. Huggins's lawyers asked the Magistrate to require a corporate officer from one of the RIAA companies -- with settlement authority -- to appear at the settlement conference. http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2005/09/atlantic-v-huggins-shook-hardy-bacon.html

On October 6th, the day before the conference, the RIAA's lawyers asked for permission for their Misssouri attorney to appear by telephone, and for the corporate officer not to appear at all. They indicated that their Missouri counsel had authority to "discuss settlement" but not that he had "settlement authority". http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2005/10/riaa-in-atlantic-v-huggins-asks.html

On October 6th, Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy ruled that (a) a corporate representative of the plaintiffs did have to appear, but could do so by telephone, and (b) the Missouri lawyer could appear by telephone rather than in person.
October 6, 2005, order of Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy.
(Alternate link)

p2pnet says "Organize"

p2pnet has called for people to engage in grassroots organizing against the RIAA lawsuit campaign:
http://p2pnet.net/story/6522

Thursday, October 06, 2005

RIAA in Atlantic v. Huggins Asks Permission for Shook Hardy Bacon to appear by telephone, and permission not to bring corporate officer

On the day before the scheduled settlement conference in peer to peer file sharing case Atlantic v. Huggins, in Brooklyn federal court, the RIAA's attorneys have asked the Magistrate Judge for permission (a) to allow the Shook Hardy Bacon attorney to appear by telephone rather than in person and (b) not to bring a corporate representative of the record companies.

The RIAA's attorney represented that the lawyers have "complete authority to discuss settlement", but did not say that they have settlement authority, which is the more usual term.

October 6, 2005, letter of Maryann E. Penney

Ed. note. Based on my experience with the RIAA cases, the lawyers do NOT have settlement authority. Having authority to "discuss" settlement is meaningless; it means having authority to waste the judge's and opposing counsel's time.
-R.B.

Wednesday, October 05, 2005

In Loud v. Does RIAA Opposes Motion to Quash in Manhattan Federal court

In Loud v. Does, a peer to peer filesharing case against numerous unknown "John Doe" defendants in Manhattan federal court, the RIAA has opposed Jane Doe's motion to quash.

Memorandum of law in opposition
(Alternate link)

Appendix to Memorandum of law in opposition
(Alternate link)

The lawyers for defendant are Ray Beckerman, Morlan Ty Rogers, and Daniel A. Singer of Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP

RIAA in Atlantic v. Huggins Opposes Defendant's Request for a Pre-Motion Conference

In an unusual step, the RIAA's lawyers, in p2p file share case Atlantic v. Huggins, have opposed defendant's request for a pre-motion conference to discuss with the Court the defendant's proposed motion to dismiss.

October 5, 2005, letter
(Alternate link)

The lawyers for defendant are Ray Beckerman, Morlan Ty Rogers, and Daniel A. Singer of Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP

"Sue 'em all" by John Hermann

p2pnet has published this interesting and informative article by John Hermann, the Berkley, Michigan, attorney representing many RIAA defendants in Detroit federal court:



Sue 'em all
By John Hermann

The recording industry and its trade association, the RIAA (Recording Industry Association of America) are in their second year of targeting users of peer-to–peer software programs under the guise of stamping out copyright infringement. The lawsuits are pursued in essentially two phases. First, The RIAA employs a team so called “investigators” who locate alleged infringers using the same software programs that they describe as being specifically designed for “online media distribution.”

As with all peer-to-peer programs, the peer-to-peer programs simply allows for the exchange of information, not all of which is copyrighted. Possible uses include such benign examples a photos among family members, research material, personal interest items.

Certain sound recordings and/or written items which are beyond the limitations of the copyright protection may also be legitimately exchanged such as works of Beethoven , Dickens, etc.

Notwithstanding the number of legitimate applications, the industry has attempted to target all peer-to-peer software systems as being primarily used to facilitate the exchange of copyrighted material.

Unfortunately, the methods locating potential infringers fail to adequately distinguish those who are, in fact, infringers from other individuals who have no association with potential infringing activity.

Typically, the RIAA minions use the very programs they claim are “vehicles for infringement” to locate other individuals either hosting or seeking files which appear to be copyrighted materials. By conducting a search or viewing another peer member’s shared list, the investigators are able to locate files which they believe constitute protected works.

For instance, if the investigative outfit were to view another peer member’s shared file bearing the name Madonna – Like A Virgin, they typically assumethe file is a audio, mp3 or WVA version of Madonna’s copyrighted sound recording . Rather than examining the contents of the file to verify that it is, in fact, a Madonna tune, the investigator simply assume it is because it's stored on a peer system and because it bears a similar identification to a popular artist.

Many of the early peer systems (ie, Kazaa, LimeWire, etc) have defaults that make it easy to identify unsophisticated infringers who may not even know what they're doing is potentially infringing.

These defaults enable other individuals, including the RIAA, to view and/or exchange all of the materials within the host's shared file. Because allowing others access to copyrighted material is also a violation of the copyright act, downloading isn't required for someone to be liable under the act. On top of that, because the potential damages for infringement are statutorily defined, based on the number of materials “exchanged,” a person could have only downloaded a couple of songs and yet still be liable for thousands of dollars in damages for each and every song that was in their folder because they're allegedly being offered for exchange.

The irony of targeting early peer system users is that the serious offenders are smart enough to change the default settings so as to mask their file hosting, or use more recent peer systems that shield the host files from view.

The naïve and uninformed, meanwhile, are easy prey for the RIAA.

Complete Text of Article.

First Annual Peer-to-Peer Litigation Summit

First Annual Peer-to-Peer Litigation Summit

When: November 3, 2005

Where: Northwestern University Law School, Chicago, IL

In September 2003, members of the Recording Association of America filed the
first wave of lawsuits against individual  peer-to-peer (P2P) file
sharers. Two years and 14,000 lawsuits later, both P2P file-sharing and
file-sharing litigation continue unabated, and members of the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) are now suing individual Internet users as
well. It's time to step back and consider where this litigation has been,
where it's going, and whether there is a better way.

This one-day conference brings together public and private defense
attorneys, clients, investigators, advocates and academics to discuss the
latest developments in peer-to-peer litigation. How do the RIAA and MPAA go
about identifying plaintiffs? What are the most effective legal strategies
and tactics? Is it better to settle immediately, or fight it out in the
courts? How is this impacting the individuals sued? What is the role of ISPs
in this quagmire? Should Congress step in and, if so, what legislation is
needed? Are there other ways to compensate authors for their
works? Panelists will address these topics and more. Audience members will
be strongly encouraged to share their experiences as well.

Cost: $150

For more information and to register for this conference, please go to
www.signmeup.com/51363.

Sponsors: Privacy Resolutions, P.C. and Electronic Frontier Foundation

RIAA Deliberately sues 14-year old

You may recall the case of Priority Records v. Chan, a case against the mother of a 13-year old girl, who may have accessed a peer to peer file sharing account. When the mother moved to have the case dismissed on summary judgment, the RIAA withdrew its case against the mother. The court held that if the RIAA wanted to sue the child, it would have to have a guardian ad litem appointed.

Incredibly, the RIAA has now brought a lawsuit against the child -- now 14 years old -- and has moved for appointment of a guardian ad litem
(Alternate link)
.
(Alternate link #2)

News coverage:

p2pnet.net

Monday, October 03, 2005

Oregon RIAA Victim Fights Back; Sues RIAA for Electronic Trespass, Violations of Computer Fraud & Abuse, Invasion of Privacy, RICO, Fraud

ATLANTIC V. ANDERSEN

This is the case peer-to-peer file sharers have been waiting for. Tanya Andersen, a 41 year old disabled single mother living in Oregon, has countersued the RIAA for Oregon RICO violations, fraud, invasion of privacy, abuse of process, electronic trespass, violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, negligent misrepresentation, the tort of "outrage", and deceptive business practices.

Ms. Andersen's counterclaims demand a trial by jury.

Ms. Andersen made the following allegations, among others:


1. For a number of years, a group of large, multinational, multi-billion dollar record companies, including these plaintiffs, have been abusing the federal court judicial
system for the purpose of waging a public relations and public threat campaign targeting digital file sharing activities. As part of this campaign, these record companies retained MediaSentry to invade private home computers and collect personal information. Based on private information allegedly extracted from these personal home computers, the record companies have reportedly filed lawsuits against more than 13,500 anonymous “John Does.”

2. The anonymous “John Doe” lawsuits are filed for the sole purpose of information farming and specifically to harvest personal internet protocol addresses from internet service providers.

3. After an individual’s personal information is harvested, it is given to the record companies’ representatives and the anonymous “John Doe” information farming suits are then typically dismissed.

4. The record companies provide the personal information to Settlement Support Center, which engages in prohibited and deceptive debt collection activities and other illegal conduct to extract money from the people allegedly identified from the secret lawsuits. Most of the people subjected to these secret suits do not learn that they have been “sued” until demand is made for payment by the record companies’ lawyers or Settlement Support Center.....

5. Tanya Andersen is a 42-year-old single mother of an eight-year-old daughter living in Tualatin, Oregon. Ms. Andersen is disabled and has a limited income from Social Security.

6. Ms. Andersen has never downloaded or distributed music online. She has not infringed on any of plaintiffs’ alleged copyrighted interest.....

7. Ms. Andersen has, however, been the victim of the record companies’ public threat campaign. The threats started when the record companies falsely claimed that Ms. Andersen had been an “unnamed” defendant who was being sued in federal court in the District of Columbia. She was never named in that lawsuit and never received service of a summons and complaint.

8. Neither did Ms. Andersen receive any timely notice that the suit even existed. That anonymous suit was filed in mid-2004. Ms. Andersen first learned that she was being “sued” when she received a letter dated February 2, 2005, from the Los Angeles, California, law firm Mitchell Silverberg & Knupp, LLP. The LA firm falsely claimed that Ms. Andersen had downloaded music, infringed undisclosed copyrights and owed hundreds of thousands of dollars. Ms. Andersen was understandably shocked, fearful, and upset. ....

9. After receiving the February 2, 2005 letter, Ms. Andersen contacted the record companies’ “representative,” which turned out to be Settlement Support Center, LLC. This company was formed by the record companies for the sole purpose of coercing payments from people who had been identified as targets in the anonymous information farming suits. Settlement Support Center is a Washington State phone solicitation company which engages in debt collection activities across the country.

10. When Ms. Andersen contacted Settlement Support Center, she was advised that her personal home computer had been secretly entered by the record companies’ agents, MediaSentry.

11. Settlement Support Center also falsely claimed that Ms. Andersen had “been viewed” by MediaSentry downloading “gangster rap” music at 4:24 a.m. Settlement Support Center also falsely claimed that Ms. Andersen had used the login name “gotenkito@kazaa.com.” Ms. Andersen does not like “gangster rap,” does not recognize the name “gotenkito,” is not awake at 4:24 a.m. and has never downloaded music.

12. Settlement Support Center threatened that if Ms. Andersen did not immediately pay them, the record companies would bring an expensive and disruptive federal lawsuit using her actual name and they would get a judgment for hundreds of thousands of dollars.

13. Ms. Andersen explained to Settlement Support Center that she had never downloaded music, she had no interest in “gangster rap,” and that she had no idea who “gotenkito” was.

14. Ms. Andersen wrote Settlement Support Center and even asked it to inspect her computer to prove that the claims made against her were false.

15. An employee of Settlement Support Center admitted to Ms. Andersen that he believed that she had not downloaded any music. He explained, however, that Settlement Support Center and the record companies would not quit their debt collection activities because to do so would encourage other people to defend themselves against the record companies’ claims.

16. Instead of investigating, the record company plaintiffs filed suit this against Ms. Andersen. F. The Record Companies have no Proof of Infringement.

17. Despite making false representations to Ms. Andersen that they had evidence of infringement .... plaintiffs knew that they had no factual support for their claims.

18. No downloading or distribution activity was ever actually observed. None ever occurred. Regardless, the record companies actively continued their coercive and deceptive debt collection actions against her. Ms. Andersen was falsely, recklessly, shamefully, and publicly accused of illegal activities in which she was never involved.

Ms. Andersen further alleged:

20. Entering a person’s personal computer without their authorization to snoop around, steal information, or remove files is a violation of the common law prohibition against trespass to chattels.

21. The record company plaintiffs employed MediaSentry as their agent to break into Ms. Andersen’s personal computer (and those of tens of thousands of other people) to secretly spy on and steal information or remove files. MediaSentry did not have Ms. Andersen’s permission to inspect, copy, or remove private computer files. If MediaSentry accessed her private computer, it did so illegally and secretly. In fact, Ms. Andersen was unaware that the trespass occurred until well after she was anonymously sued.

22. According to the record companies, the agent, Settlement Support Center used the stolen private information allegedly removed from her home computer in their attempt to threaten and coerce Ms. Anderson into paying thousands of dollars. ....

Under the provisions of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030) it is illegal to break into another person’s private computer to spy, steal or remove private information, damage property, or cause other harm.

26. Ms. Andersen regularly used her personal computer to communicate with friends and family across the country and for interstate e-commerce. Ms. Andersen had password protection and security in place to protect her computer and personal files from access by others.

27. The record company plaintiffs employed MediaSentry as their agent to bypass Ms. Andersen’s computer security systems and break into her personal computer to secretly spy and steal or remove private information. MediaSentry did not have her permission to inspect, copy, or remove her private computer files. It gained access secretly and illegally.

28. According to the record companies’ agent, Settlement Support Center, used this stolen private information in their attempt to threaten and coerce Ms. Andersen into paying thousands of dollars. ....

31. According to the record companies, Ms. Andersen’s personal computer was invaded by MediaSentry after she was identified with a nine digit code (an Internet Protocol Address (“IPA”)) obtained from the anonymous information farming lawsuits. MediaSentry did not have permission to inspect Ms. Andersen’s private computer files. It gained access only by illegal acts of subterfuge.

32. The record companies’ agent has falsely represented that information obtained in this invasive and secret manner is proof of Ms. Andersen’s alleged downloading. Ms. Andersen never downloaded music but has been subjected to public derision and embarrassment associated with plaintiffs’ claims and public relations campaign.

33. The record companies have used this derogatory, harmful information to recklessly and shamefully publicly accuse Ms. Andersen of illegal activities without even taking the opportunity offered by Ms. Andersen to inspect her computer. .....

36. Despite knowing that infringing activity was not observed, the record companies used the threat of expensive and intrusive litigation as a tool to coerce Ms. Andersen to pay many thousands of dollars for an obligation she did not owe. The record companies pursued their collection activities and this lawsuit for the primary purpose of threatening Ms. Andersen (and many others) as part of its public relations campaign targeting electronic file sharing.

37. The record companies have falsely represented and pleaded that information obtained in this invasive and secret manner is proof of Ms. Andersen’s alleged downloading and distribution of copyrighted audio recordings. Ms. Andersen never downloaded music but has been subjected to public derision and embarrassment.....

40. The record companies knowingly represented materially false information to Ms. Andersen in an attempt to extort money from her.

41. For example, between February and March 2005, the record companies, through their collection agent Settlement Support Center, falsely claimed that they had proof that Ms. Andersen’s IPA had been “viewed” downloading and distributing over 1,000 audio files for which it sought to collect hundreds of thousands of dollars. This statement was materially false. Ms. Andersen never downloaded or distributed any audio files nor did the record companies or any of their agents ever observe any such activity associated with her personal home computer.....

49. Despite having never observed any downloading or distribution associated with Ms. Andersen’s personal home computer and despite refusing Ms. Andersen’s offer to allow an inspection of her own computer, the record companies wrongfully continued their improper debt collection activities against her.....

50. The record companies pursued debt collection activities for the inappropriate purpose of illegally threatening Ms. Andersen and many thousands of others. This tortious abuse was motivated by and was a central part of a public relations campaign targeting electronic file sharing.

51. An employee of Settlement Support Center admitted to Ms. Andersen that he believed that she had not downloaded any music. He explained that Settlement Support Center and the record companies would not quit the debt collection activity against her because to do so would encourage other people to defend themselves against the record companies’ claims.

52. The record companies were aware of Ms. Andersen’s disabilities and her serious health issues. Settlement Support Center knew that its conduct would cause extreme distress in Ms. Andersen. As a result of defendant’s conduct, Ms. Andersen suffered severe physical and emotional distress and health problems.

53. The record companies’ conduct resulted in damages, including harm to Ms. Andersen’s health and property in an amount to be specifically proven at trial......

55. Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act prohibits those in trade or commerce from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices in the course of business with consumers. ORS 646.605 et seq.

56. The record companies’ agent, Settlement Support Center, is a company doing business in Washington which was established to engage in debt collection activities in manystates, including Washington and Oregon.

57. Settlement Support Center acting as the record companies’ agent made false and deceptive statements to Ms. Andersen in an attempt to mislead, threaten, and coerce her into paying thousands of dollars.

58. Settlement Support Center acting as the record companies’ agent has made similar false and deceptive statements to many other residents of Washington and Oregon, and across the country. The public interest has been and continues to be directly impacted by plaintiffs’ deceptive practices.

59. The record companies’ conduct resulted in damages and harm to Ms. Andersen and her property in an amount to be specifically proven at trial. ....

61. The Oregon Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act prohibits companies from engaging in organized racketeering or criminal activities. ORS 166.715 et seq.

62. As fully set forth above, the record companies hired MediaSentry to break into private computers to spy, view files, remove information, and copy images. The record companies received and transmitted the information and images to Settlement Support Center. As the record companies’ agent, Settlement Support Center then falsely claimed that the stolen information and images showed Ms. Andersen’s downloading and distributing over 1,000 audio files. The record companies falsely claimed that Ms. Anderson owed hundreds of thousands of dollars in an attempt to coerce and extort payment from her.

63. The record companies directed its agents to unlawfully break into private computers and engage in extreme acts of unlawful coercion, extortion, fraud, and other criminal conduct.

64. The record companies and their agents stood to financially benefit from these deceptive and unlawful acts. Proceeds from these activities are used to fund the operation of the record companies’ continued public threat campaigns.

65. These unlawful activities were not isolated. The record companies have repeated these unlawful and deceptive actions with many other victims throughout the United States.

Answer and counterclaim.
(Alternate link)

Ms. Andersen is represented by:
Lory R. Lybeck
Lybeck Murphy, LLP
500 Island Corporate Center
7525 SE 24 Street
Mercer Island, WA 98040-2336
(206) 230-4255
lrl@lybeckmurphy.com

Technical Difficulties

It appears that, due to the popularity of the answer and counterclaims in Atlantic v. Andersen, the data transfer capacity of the web site I use to host the litigation documents has been exceeded.

I will attempt to get some alternative links.

Sorry for the inconvenience.

-R.B.